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ABSTRACT: Understanding, for Kant, does not intuit, and intuition—which involves 
empirical information, i.e., sense-data—does not entail thinking. What is crucial to 
Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without 
intuitions are empty is the idea that we have no knowledge unless we combine concepts 
with intuition. Although concepts and intuition are radically separated mental powers, 
without a way of bringing them together (i.e., synthesis) there is no knowledge for Kant. 
Thus Kant’s metaphysical-scientific dualism: (scientific) knowledge is limited to the 
world of phenomena—the world of appearance—while the thing-in-itself is unknowable 
because there is no intuition that can correspond to the it. This paper sets to cull Béatrice 
Longuenesse’s recent work on the first-person ‘I’ and put forth a novel Kantian 
approach to the first-person reference of mental states, working in the tradition of P.F. 
Strawson, Rudolf Carnap, and Wilfrid Sellars, while offering an empirical study of 
deafferentation to ground the thesis that the binding of representations is separate from 
phenomenal consciousness. Accordingly, we stake a kind of self-consciousness vis-à-vis 
the Fundamental Reference-Rule qua apperception that, while intimately connected to 
consciousness of one’s own body, apperception is nevertheless distinct from it and is, 
moreover, the condition for any use of ‘I’. We compliment neuroscientist Oliver Sacks’ 
research with Ned Block’s recent work on “no-post‐perceptual cognition” and 
attentional variation to couch Kant’s schema in perceptual psychology. We navigate 
Kant’s work on intuitions (viz. sensation, perception, and the empirical side of the 
cognitive faculties) and indirect realism/weak representationism first via Sellars’ 
naturalization of Kant’s inaccessible thing-in-itself, before challenging Sellars’ 
functionalist and inferentialist conception of perception and discursive intentionality. 
We ultimately endeavor to conceptualize the limit-conditions regarding our having 
reportable knowledge about our access to percepts and concepts. 
KEYWORDS: Kant; Philosophy of mind; Strawson; Sellars; Reason; Noumena 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 406 
I  
NATURALIZED NOUMENA: MORALITY AND MENTALITY IN 
STRAWSON, SELLARS, AND LONGUENESSE 
I  
In the broadest possible sense, realism can be understood as either 
the  metaphysical thesis that there exists a world independently of our feelings, 
sensings, thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes or as the epistemological thesis that the 
structure of such a mind-independent world, granting its existence, is knowable 
to some extent. Idealism, the polar opposite of realism, can be understood as the 
thesis that the external world is fundamentally mind-dependent. Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, taking up the fundamental principles behind Descartes’ 
rationalism and the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, can be seen as 
splitting the divide between realism and antirealism by offering the best of both 
worlds: self-consciousness reveals that we are fundamentally embodied subjects 
wherein the immediate objects of perception correspond to ideas of the 
perceiving subject. Pace Descartes’ skepticism, Kant takes this thesis to its 
conclusion: we have no direct knowledge of reality in-itself—as, following Kant’s 
account, appearances are not extrinsic properties of things in themselves but mere 
representations—and have epistemic access to only our mental representations, 
from which we infer the existence of an independent reality. However, a problem 
with Kant’s position is that it is unclear how it fits into the physical world; in 
particular, it is unclear how to naturalize Kant's inferential conception of 
"binding mental representations" which are percepts that correspond to external 
objects, while retaining Kant's conception of the noumena, a concept that 
depends on practical reason and seems to register outside the spatio-temporal 
domain of transeunt causality.  
There are two options to pursue this strategy: weak naturalism and strong 
naturalism. The former entails both that everything is objective, physical, or 
material, and that everything subjective, mental, or conscious is explicable 
according to laws of nature (however we define these laws). The latter involves 
the added claim that not only everything subjective, mental, or conscious, but 
also that everything ideal, normative, and formal is explicable according to laws 
of nature. In naturalizing Kant’s noumena, while serving the telos of a physicalist 
philosophy of mind, must we altogether abandon the metaphysical and ethical 
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concept according to which we, as causally determined agents, can conceptualize 
our thoughts, actions, and beliefs as beholden to self-determination? 
Furthermore, can we naturalize Kant’s schema in the strong sense, such that the 
coordination of sensations into percepts of particular objects is not understood as 
a faculty of the transcendental power of imagination but via a model that takes 
into account the neural correlates of perceptual experience? 
 
II 
Consequently, this paper aims to purpose a strong naturalist reading of Kant vis-
à-vis, and in service of, the contemporary philosophy of consciousness qua 
perception. The choice of which naturalist rendering to pursue, without 
compromising Kant’s schema thus becomes relevant. Contemporary 
philosophers of mind like Frank Jackson may attempt to navigate the problem of 
explaining how the mind fits into the physical world by underscoring the 
diaphanousness of act-object structure—objects as we perceive them correspond 
to and track the external world, where to have an experience is to stand in a 
relation of awareness to an object with properties that determine the kind of 
experience undergone. Jackson endorses diaphanousness, whereby “accessing 
the nature of the experience itself is nothing other than accessing the properties 
of its object” and espouses strong representationalism, according to which the nature 
of experience entails accessing and exhausting the external world. For Jackson, 
that experience is diaphanous (or transparent) is a thesis about the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience: the properties that make an 
experience the kind of experience it is are the properties of the object of 
experience.1 On the other hand, a physicalist such as Ned Block may espouse 
“weak representationism,” separating phenomenal consciousness from mental 
representation and maintaining that while perceptual experiences are (perhaps 
essentially) representational, they may also have phenomenal or qualitative 
properties that cannot be reduced to their representational contents. On this 
second view, conscious experience may involve primitive forms of internally 
determined phenomenal representation that cannot be defined in functional-
 
1 Torin Alter and Sven Walter, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on 
Consciousness and Physicalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2007), 5. 
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externalist terms, as certain experiences may have built-in/internally-determined 
spatial representational contents—Block understand minds in terms of our neural 
machinery, highlighting how our internal biological makeup (specifically, its 
electrochemical character) is essential to conscious phenomenology. Block’s view 
offers a successor-concept to Kant’s conception that the senses and intellect serve 
separable albeit related roles, the former playing a passive view in receiving 
stimulations from the environment and the latter generating novel 
representations under the executive control of the perceiver in binding 
representations together. For our purposes, following Kant, it is not a live option 
to endorse the Cartesian interactionist dualist position taken up by those like 
David Chalmers who, despite being neutral about various dualist positions, 
grants epiphenomena causal validity while mixing physical and nonphysical 
events in a single causal chain.2  
As such contemporary rifts regarding the metaphysics of mind demonstrate, 
 
2 As demonstrated by Jackson’s knowledge argument, Jackson first thought there was some factual 
knowledge about color experience that Mary lacks in the black and white room and that what she lacks 
does not amount to just a set of recognitional or imaginative abilities. When Jackson came to consider the 
factual knowledge that Mary possess in the black-and-white room as including facts about what color 
experiences represents he turned to strong representationism (note: I choose this term, 
“representationism,” and not “representationalism,” as I am taking after Ned Block’s distinction). 
Invoking G.E. Moore, Jackson contends that the most phenomenally salient features of perceptual features 
are its act-object structure and diaphanousness. Jackson's endorsement of the ability argument is via strong 
representationalism, with this argument’s primary contribution being the characterization of 
phenomenologically salient objects of experiences as intentional objects, rather than instantiated properties 
that experience acquaints us with; accordingly, all differences in phenomenal character of these experiences 
can be fully explained as differences in their intentional objects or representational contents. As far as 
perceiving red is concerned, according to the ability argument, what is distinctive about the experience of 
red for the first time is that it represents an external property red, rather than some other color property. 
Janet Levine summarizes Jackson’s use of strong representationalism adeptly, remarking that: “if what is 
distinctive about the experience of red is that it represents the (external) property red (rather than some 
other color property), and if that experience meets certain further functionally specified conditions that 
distinguish it from beliefs or thoughts about red, and if the representation relation is some sort of causal-
informational relation, then it seems as though everything that’s distinctive about the experience of red can 
be deduced a priori from the physical facts. Moreover, if all the introspectively accessible distinctions among 
different types of experiences are, as strong representationalists contend, exhausted by their representational 
contents, then it seems more plausible to hold that the only thing that Mary acquires when she leaves her 
room is the ability to ‘recognize, remember, and imagine the state’ in question.” See: Janet Levin, 
“Representational Exhaustion” in Blockheads!, eds. D. Stoljar and A. Pautz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2019), 251; Frank Jackson, “Mind and illusion” in There’s Something about Mary, eds. P. Ludlow, Y. 
Nagasawa and D. Stoljar, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 421–442; 
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one may be a metaphysical or epistemological realist about mind-dependent 
entities or properties. More broadly, epistemological realism presupposes 
metaphysical realism, but not vice versa. For one may claim that although we can 
minimally stipulate that there is a mind-independent world, we cannot know how 
this world is constituted. Kant’s position is paradigmatic in this regard: he 
postulates that beyond the fabric of appearances lies the “thing-in-itself ” which 
he terms “the noumenon”—the idea of a mind-independent reality required to 
theoretically explain what appearances are appearances of. Kant thereby 
distinguishes between our representings of things insofar as they appear mediated 
by our senses and intellect, and the reality of things conceived outside of any 
correlation to experience or experiencers. Kant’s noumenon is at once a 
“postulate of reason,” introduced to explain the source of our objective 
representings, and that which is always beyond the aesthetic and intellectual 
powers which make up such representations. Accordingly, to claim objective 
knowledge of the in-itself constitutes a transgression to the limits of pure reason, 
an illegitimate transposition of what belongs to experience into a world beyond 
it. Insofar as we must infer its existence, the in-itself remains for-us a “thought-
object” (ens rationis)—a “boundary concept” without an object—corresponding to 
no empirical intuition and thus having only a negative or regulative use. As Kant 
says, 
In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such ‘noumena’ 
and the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e., we 
have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility problematically, but 
no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which 
objects outside of the field of sensibility could be given, and about which the 
understanding could be employed assertorically. The concept of a noumenon is 
therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the pretension of 
sensibility, and therefore only of negative use.3 
Kant’s idealist successors would question the motivations behind the “rational 
necessity” accorded to the noumenon, interrogating the conditions of 
intelligibility at stake in speaking about a reality that lies beyond the limits of 
 
3 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), A254—255/B310—311 
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experience and also challenging the skeptical conclusions that followed from the 
critical method. Paradigmatically, Hegel’s speculative idealism attempts to 
overcome transcendental critique (and its aspiration to delineate the conditions 
of possible experience) in the name of an “immanent critique” apposite to the 
ideal of “absolute knowing.” In doing so, Hegel makes the difference between 
how things appear for-us and things as they are in-themselves intrinsic to the way 
in which consciousness relates to its object. Consequently, Hegel argues, 
consciousness is itself nothing but the difference between the object as it is in-
itself and as it is for-itself. For already in empirical perceiving consciousness 
implicitly distinguishes between the knowing or concept of an object insofar as it 
appears for-itself and the truth of the object as it is in-itself. While this difference 
is made explicit by the phenomenological observer, it is necessarily constitutive 
of consciousness, for the difference between how things are and how they appear 
is required to make intelligible how the experience of error, nevermind 
knowledge, is possible.4 Hegel’s “phenomenological science” takes as its own 
object the being for-consciousness of the in-itself, making explicit the way which 
consciousness implicitly distinguishes between knowing and truth, where the 
latter functions as a conceptually structured normative standard that provides the 
measure for the former, rather than as an epistemological limit indexing a 
transcendent and ineffable beyond: 
Since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, the investigation will 
be a comparison of consciousness with its own self; for the distinction just made 
falls in it. In consciousness, one moment is for an other; in other words, 
consciousness in general has the determination of the moment of knowledge in 
it. At the same time, this “other” is to consciousness not only something for it; it 
is also something outside this relationship or in itself: the moment of truth. 
Therefore, in what consciousness within its own self designates as the in-itself or 
the true, we have the standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure 
its knowledge.5 
This way of observing the subject matter is our contribution; it does not exist 
for the consciousness which we observe. But when viewed in this way the 
 
4 Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 70—72. 
5 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) 
[section]84. 
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sequence of experiences constituted by consciousness is raised to the level of a 
scientific progression […] A moment which is both in-itself and for-us is thereby 
introduced into the movement of consciousness, a moment which does not 
present itself for the consciousness engaged in the experience itself. But the 
content of what we see emerging exists for it, and we comprehend only the formal 
aspect of what emerges or its pure emerging. For consciousness, what has 
emerged exists only as an object; for us, it exists at once as movement and 
becoming.6 
Initiating an adjacent and revisionary historical trajectory, the neo-Kantian 
recoil against Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel in the late 19th Century worked to 
rekindle the scope of the transcendental epistemological investigation into the 
limits of experience in the wake of new advances in the natural and social 
sciences, against the perceived metaphysical excesses of speculative idealism. 
This recasting of the transcendental project would be exacerbated in twentieth 
century attempts to radicalize rather than to overcome critique—
paradigmatically, in the phenomenological and post-phenomenological tradition 
following from the works of Husserl and Heidegger. Although the analytic 
tradition was also inspired by a recoil against the perceived rise and influence of 
Hegelianism—particularly the British Hegelians—its early proponents were 
likewise hostile to the psychologistic tendencies of neo-Kantianism. As Robert 
Brandom argues, abjuring their youthful idealism, for Moore and Russell, the 
“idealist rot” had already set in with Kant, leading then to a rehabilitation of the 
empiricist tradition, avoiding the anti-realist swamp of the “dangerous oxbow of 
German Idealism” altogether.7  
Only in the works of P.F. Strawson, Carnap, and (later) Sellars, would analytic 
philosophy retrieve the legacy of German Idealism and interrogate the 
epistemological and metaphysical assumptions guiding its empiricist 
envelopment, at times even anticipating the arrival of its “Kantian phase.” 
Reforming the constructive tenets of neo-Kantianism in light of the great 
genealogical and historical critiques of Western philosophy emblemized in the 
works Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud—the great “masters of suspicion” of the 19th 
 
6 Ibid., [section]87 
7 Robert Brandom, “From German Idealism to American Pragmatism – and Back” in Kant Und Die 
Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht, eds. Margit Ruffing et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 107.  
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Century—blossomed an orientation of thought proposing to examine forms of 
mediation beyond the aesthetic and cognitive faculties explored in Kant’s 
representational account of subjectivity. This took into consideration the 
practical, social, and cultural determinations that comprise our collective 
historical being, progressively dislodging transcendental critique from its 
“psychologistic” or even phenomenological envelopment. At the same time, as 
experience was revealed to be underdetermined by ever more inescapable and 
impersonal forms of mediation, the idea of ineffable or unmediated being was 
likewise radicalized, progressively leading philosophy to a crisis that exacerbated 
the skeptical conclusions to which the critical method was led. Thus unspooled 
novel approaches to naturalizing Kant. 
Chiefly drawing from Strawson’s and Sellars’ respective projects for a 
“naturalized Kantianism,” we here present a constructive rejoinder integrating 
two vectors—one ethical and the other metaphysical—while presenting a defense 
of transcendental epistemology as propaedeutic to ontology, reconciling the latter 
via the prospects of structural naturalism. We begin by tracing Strawson’s ethical 
naturalization of Kant vis-à-vis compatibilist determinism, as articulated in 
Strawson’s oft-quoted paper “Freedom and Resentment.”8 We then move on to 
Sellars’ realist epistemology and its naturalist vim, with an interest in his critique 
of immediate sensory experiences and perceptual representation, as well as 
Sellars’ epistemic upgrading of propositional inferences.  
The latter section of our analysis reinvigorates the naturalized Kantian spirit 
of Strawson and Sellars in Béatrice Longuenesse’s recent work on Kant. 
Surprisingly little scholarship has been published that situates Longuenesse 
beyond the fold of a Kantian interlocutor but, as we shall demonstrate, 
Longuenesse does not merely interpret Kant but offers new metaphysical 
renderings. Via Longuenesse, we derive a kind of self-consciousness that, while 
intimately connected to consciousness of one’s own body, is nevertheless distinct 
from it and is, moreover, the condition for any use of the first-person “I.”9 Vide Freud, 
Longuenesse also couches Kant’s moral “I ought to” and the Categorical 
 
8 P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1974), 1—28. 
9 Béatrice Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017). 
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Imperative’s compulsive nature in emotion, rather than reason.10 For Kant, 
understanding does not intuit and intuition does not entail thinking. What is 
crucial to Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts 
without intuitions are empty is the idea that we have no knowledge unless we combine 
concepts with intuition. Although concepts and intuition are radically separated 
mental powers, without a way of bringing them together (i.e., synthesis) there is 
no knowledge. Thus Kant’s metaphysical-scientific dualism: (scientific) 
knowledge is limited to the world of phenomena—the world of appearance—
while the thing-in-itself is unknowable because there is no intuition that can 
correspond to the thing-in-itself. Drawing from Oliver Sacks’ research on 
polyneuropathy and Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal- and access-
consciousness, we consider Kant’s work on intuitions (conscious, objective 
representations of an object, event, etc.) and the vagaries of a putatively 
epistemically foreclosed in-itself as applied to questions of consciousness.11 
Threading the philosophy of mind qua metaphysical realism, we ultimately 
endeavor to conceptualize the limit-conditions regarding our having reportable 
knowledge about our access to percepts and concepts. 
 
III 
Kant’s expressed worry in the Third Paralogism of Personality in the First 
Critique is in developing a concept of personhood that, given an empirically 
accessible entity conscious of its own identity at different times, is “necessary” and 
“sufficient” for practical use: 
Meanwhile, the concept of personality, just like the concepts of substance and of 
the simple, can remain (insofar as it is merely transcendental, i.e., a unity of the 
subject which is otherwise unknown to us, but in whose determinations there is a 
thoroughgoing connection of apperception), and to this extent this concept is also 
necessary and sufficient for practical use; but we can never boast of it as an 
extension of our self-knowledge through pure reason.12 
 Kant’s solution of “necessary and sufficient for practical use” is not given 
 
10 Béatrice Longuenesse, The First Person in Cognition and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019). 
11 Ned Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18, 
no. (1995): 227–87. 
12 Kant, CPR, A365-6. 
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in the Third Paralogism, but in the solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure 
Reason: 
By freedom in the cosmological sense, on the contrary, I understand the faculty of 
beginning a state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under 
another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature. Freedom 
in this signification is a pure transcendental idea [….] Freedom in the practical 
sense is the independence of the power of choice from necessitation by impulses of 
sensibility. For a power of choice is sensible insofar as it is pathologically affected 
(through moving-causes of sensibility); it is called an animal power of choice 
(arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated.13  
Kant concedes that if our existence were only that of spatiotemporal entities 
belonging to the sensible world, subject to universal causal laws, then there would 
be no room for metaphysical freedom—that is, for being an uncaused cause, a 
cause posited sui generis that has the power to start a causal chain without being 
itself determined to do so. Referencing the Groundwork for Metaphysics, published 
one year before the second edition of the Critique of  Pure Reason, Kant notes in the 
concluding remarks to the Paralogism of Pure Reason: 
Suppose there subsequently turned up—not in experience but in certain (not 
merely logical rules but) laws holding firm a priori and concerning our existence—
the occasion for presupposing ourselves to be legislative fully a priori in regard to 
our own existence, and as self-determining in this existence; then this would 
disclose a spontaneity through which our actuality is determinable without the 
need of conditions of empirical intuition; and here we would become aware that in 
the consciousness of our existence something is contained a priori that can serve to 
determine our existence, which is thoroughly determinable only sensibly, in regard 
to a certain inner faculty in relation to an intelligible world (obviously one only 
thought of). (B430–1.) 
The notion of person that is defined in the major premise of the Third 
Paralogism is described by Kant as conceiving of “a being that can be thought of 
in every respect, and consequently even as it might be given in intuition.”14 There 
is also a minor premise here: that using the ‘I’ in ‘I think’ means expressing 
consciousness of oneself in unity over time.15 Thus the major premise of the Third 
 
13 Ibid., A533–4/B561–2; cf A549–58/B577–86. 
14 Ibid., B411-2 
15 “I am an object of inner sense and all time is merely the form of inner sense. Consequently, I relate 
each and every one of my successive determinations to the numerically identical Self in all time, i.e., in the 
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Paralogism, dealing with the concept of “personhood,” has two features: i) the 
unity of apperception (the unity of consciousness of contents of mental states, 
which makes it possible for the 'I think' to accompany them);16 ii) the numerical 
identity through time of a spatiotemporal living being who possess mental states.  
Kant designates that having a will that is determined under the moral law is 
what makes us “persons” in the moral sense—i.e., individuals capable of self-
determination; “pure and practical reason,” in turn, makes us accountable for 
our actions. For Kant, the notion of person that is “necessary and sufficient” for 
practical use includes not solely the “psychological” notion (that a person is an 
entity that is conscious of what is their own identity at different temporal 
moments), but also a “moral” notion—a person is a conscious being that has a 
“rational will,” a faculty of desire determined under the moral law, which is the 
Categorical Imperative. Where Hypothetical Imperatives present the practical 
necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving interests which one desires, 
Categorical Imperatives index actions that are, of themselves, objectively 
necessary, without regard to any other end.17 The necessity for such a noumenal 
“border-concept” is directly tethered to Kant’s recognition that if everything we 
do were determined according to solely universal causal laws, we would deserve 
neither reward nor punishment.18 Kant, drafting compatibilism, seeks to 
 
form of the inner intuition of myself. On this basis the personality of the soul must be regarded not as 
inferred but rather as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time, and that is also the 
cause of its being valid a priori. For it really says no more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious 
of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of my Self, and it is all the same whether I 
say that this whole time is in Me, as an individual unity.” Ibid., A362. 
16 The unity of apperception makes it possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany mental states; the ‘I’ in ‘I 
think’ expresses the consciousness of oneself (that is to say, the thinking of oneself) as remaining identical 
throughout the holding together of one’s representations. See: Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine, 146-152.  
17 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Allen W. Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), [section]2 
18 Galen Strawson similarly argues for the impossibility of moral responsibility with the following basic 
argument: 1) You do what you do in the circumstances in which you find yourself because of the way you 
are. 2) If you are going to be ultimately held responsible for what you, you ultimately have to be responsible 
for the way you are. 3) You are not ultimately responsible for the way you are and, therefore, C) you cannot 
be ultimately held responsible for what you do. More specifically, who we are is the result of genetic 
determination and early experiences (nature and nurture); since we cannot create ourselves like an uncaused 
cause (causa sui), responsibility is completely out of our control, tethered entirely to luck. Nonetheless, he 
concedes that the epiphenomenal feeling of free will is something we are locked in to. Galen Strawson, “The 
Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75, no. 1/2 (1994): 5-24. 
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demonstrate that the causal determination of every event by temporally 
antecedent conditions is compatible with the idea of certain events having 
another kind of cause, belonging to the noumenal sphere and exempt from the 
temporal condition, thus “acting” freely. Here, Kant confronts the problems 
introduced by determinism. As it relates to moral freedom and responsibility, 
moral law—universally legislating through all its maxims—is, for Kant, the ratio 
cognoscendi of freedom: “our consciousness of the moral law we find in ourselves 
just is our consciousness of our own freedom.”19 However, the concept of person 
developed by Kant in the Third Paralogism is not sufficient for practical use; it is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the practical use of reason because 
while it engages with the psychological facet—that a person is an entity that is 
conscious of their identity at different times as the entity they are—it does not 
deal with the moral aspect (i.e., the “rational will”). It would appear that, in the 
first Critique, Kant falls prey to his own paralogism, as no objective determination 
of myself as a thinking and willing entity or a claim to be an uncaused cause can 
be determined from the use of ‘I’ in “I ought to.”20 
There is, indeed, a severing that Kant exacts between nature and freedom, 
insofar as the noumena is linked to pure practical reason. A fundamental 
difficulty is brought to bear by the relation between moral law, which depends 
on the faculty of reason alone, and actions that unfold in the sensible world and 
are causally necessitated; this speaks, more broadly, to the distinction in The 
Architectonic of Pure Reason of the duality of two distinct concepts of philosophy 
for Kant: Schulbegriff (the scholastic concept) and Weltbegriff (the cosmological 
concept). The former deals with the object of science and technical study, and 
the latter the cosmological or universal concept, which is concerned with the 
relation of all knowledge to the essential aims of human reason. A notion of a 
person, in the moral sense, as an entity belonging in the empirical world does 
transpire in Kant’s posterior work, where consciousness of being a person is 
deemed equipollent to consciousness of unconditional maxims. For Kant, 
metaphysical freedom is linked to the moral “I ought to” which is a byproduct of 
being conscious of one’s own self-determination, a first-person standpoint on 
 
19 Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine, 153. 
20 Ibid.,  
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oneself that offers no insight into any kind of objective causal determination, i.e., 
a claim to be an uncaused cause. 
In the Critique of  Practical Reason Kant further develops the position that he 
began to develop in the Third Antinomy of the First Critique; where the latter 
allotted a notion of obligation via “transcendental freedom,” in the Second 
Critique, Kant argues from the fact of moral obligation to the noumenal reality 
of moral freedom.21 For Kant, the Categorical Imperative’s normative grip, in 
being linked to reason itself, has an innate psychological obligation—it just is and, 
therefore, we feel its compulsion. Elaborating on this putative objective necessity, 
and the link between reason, freedom, and moral responsibility, is the onus for 
any philosopher naturalizing Kantian freedom. A second-order demand is 
explaining, then, why and how a society’s moral system can be reformed if 
Categorical Imperatives are unconditional and an extension of the in-itself. Kant 
falls into the same fallacious inference he accuses Descartes and rationalist 
metaphysicians of in his first Critique, because he sets up a necessary condition for 
understanding oneself as morally accountable for one’s actions, but this does not 
belong to an objective standpoint re: causal determination but to the subjective 
and universally stipulated standpoint about agency of actions; thus, Kant 
participates in an equivocation, his middle term being “self-determining.”22 
Kant, in linking these two problems by way of the unity of mental states, 
provides a path for the philosophy of mind to keep in mind two registers that 
inform one another—i) self-legislating action and determined causality; ii) 
phenomenal consciousness and the binding of representations. The Kantian, or 
neo-Kantian, doctrine of “two standpoints” compatibilism proffers a position 
where the compatibilist thinks that facts about the physical world and facts about 
human action occupy different realms, “standpoints,” or conceptual schemes, 
and, therefore, cannot be brought into conflict with one another. 
Correspondingly, claims that we are free and that the world is deterministic 
cannot be made to contradict. Strawson’s endeavor in “Freedom and 
Resentment” begins here. Strawson culls Kant by naturalizing moral freedom as 
independent from the contingencies (e.g., history or circumstances) that the truth 
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of determinism might imply.  
Evoking Kant’s notion of the “rational will,” Strawson offers that we have a 
natural, nonrational (not ir-rational) commitment to engaging in 
characteristically interpersonal relationships. Observing our actual practices, 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics is directed at the integration of a complex of 
conceptual resources within our commonsense realistic conception of experience; 
thus metaphysical freedom involves an epistemological confrontation with 
coherence theories of justification. The quality of others’ wills towards us matters 
to us and are manifest in their behavior such that we put some set of demands on 
the quality of others’ wills; accordingly, we will react in certain ways when those 
demands are violated. Participant reactive attitudes include “gratitude, 
resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.”23 Strawson also speaks of what 
he calls an “objective attitude,” 
The objective attitude is not only something we naturally tend to fall into in cases 
[of] abnormalities or immaturity. It is also something which is available as a 
resource in other cases. The objective attitude is not only something we naturally 
tend to fall into in cases [of] abnormalities or immaturity. It is also something which 
is available as a resource in other cases, too . . . we can sometimes look with 
something like the same [objective] eye on the behavior of the normal and mature. 
We have this resource and can sometimes use it—as a refuge, say, from the strains 
of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity.24 
According to Strawson, the “objective attitude” extends the logic of exemption 
from moral demands. The distinction between exemption and excuse is critical to 
Strawson’s picture of responsibility: in addition to our personal reactive attitudes 
are impersonal or vicarious analogues. Cases of excuse are those in which we 
suspend or modify reactive attitudes due to error about the quality of the will; we 
might include an agent who is innocently ignorant, acting in accident, or acting 
unintentionally. In cases of excuse, we exculpate the injury in question but do not 
question the quality of the person’s will; the usual moral demands stay in place—
this one act is excused. However, there are also cases of exemption. We encounter 
this in the case of small children, people suffering from dementia, or those with 
forms of other serious mental illness. We might view such people as equipped 
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with mental attributes such that we are disposed not to indulge in our reactive 
attitudes of resentment, approbation, etc., since they are incapable of ordinary 
interpersonal relating. Thus, in cases of exemption, rather than react with the 
corresponding reactive attitudes, we do not take a moral view of others, adopting 
the objective attitude and exempting them from the usual demands. 
As mentioned above, the objective attitude can also work as a “resource,” as we 
sometimes shift from reactive to objective attitude even in cases in which the will 
is neither “immature, diseased, nor in extreme or unusual circumstances.”25 
These are instrumental scenarios of emotional effort, as demonstrated in 
scenarios of emotive disengagement from the stresses of involvement. 
Considering that we can adopt this “resource,” the skeptic, an incompatibilist 
about freedom and responsibility, asks could or should the acceptance of the 
determinist thesis lead us always to look on everyone exclusively this way, where 
the acceptance of determinism entails the decay or repudiation of participant 
reactive attitudes?26For the unconvinced pessimist, a metaphysics of morals could 
enumerate an argument that starts from claims about the nature of moral 
requirement or moral demand and reach the conclusion that moral demands 
require a form of control, possibility, originality, or spontaneity, which is ruled out 
by the truth of determinism. Thus, it would follow that we would universalize the 
objective attitude, applying the “resource” indiscriminately. Constructing a response, 
Strawson considers two naturalizing trajectories.  
The first is the (simple) Humean interpretation. This rendering follows from 
Strawson’s analysis that, because determinism is an entirely general thesis true of 
everyone at all times, its truth would not show that we are not morally responsible 
since we are not capable of abandoning our reactive attitudes given our 
psychological limitations. Thus, we are ineluctably freighted with treating each 
other as if we are morally responsible. Strawson writes, 
According to Hume the naturalist, skeptical doubts are not to be met by argument. 
They are simply to be neglected…. because they are idle; powerless against the 
force of nature, of our naturally implanted disposition to belief. This does not mean 
that Reason has no part to play in relation to our beliefs concerning matters of fact 
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and existence. It has a part to play, though a subordinate one.27 
Just as Hume, appealing to Nature, posits two commitments—the existence 
of body and the general reliability of inductive belief formation—Strawson’s 
Humean interpretation conceives of our moral framework as a “given.” Recall 
Hume’s refrain that our beliefs in the general reliability of induction are not 
grounded beliefs and, simultaneously, not open to serious doubt—rather, they are 
outside our critical and rational competence because they define the area in 
which that competence is exercised. Similarly, once we are “inside” a moral 
framework, questions of justification have free rein. Granting the Humean claim 
that (only) certain “framework” commitments are unconditionally immune to 
questions of justification, we can challenge which commitments belong to the 
framework and why those, and only those, need no justification. This leads to the 
unsatisfactory conclusion that if someone lacks the ability to do or change 
something, then their continuing in the status quo neither calls for nor permits 
justification.28 Thus Strawson’s preferred rendering, the broadly Wittgensteinian 
interpretation: 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between those matters—those propositions—which are 
up for question and decision in the light of reason and experience and those which 
are not, which are, as he puts it, ‘exempt from doubt.’ …We do not, for example, 
find in Wittgenstein any explicit repetition of Hume’s quite explicit appeal to 
Nature....Above all, there is, in Wittgenstein’s work…the distinction between ‘what 
it is vain’ to make a matter of inquiry, what ‘we must take for granted in all our 
reasonings,’ as Hume puts it, on the one hand, and what is genuinely matter for 
inquiry on the other.29 
This reading proffers that Strawson forwards a conceptual line of thought 
wherefore we can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice 
using notions that are, themselves, constituted by this practice. We cannot ask 
whether our moral practices themselves are appropriate, right, or fair, just as we 
cannot sensibly call the game of baseball, itself taken as a whole, “fair” or “foul.” 
According to the broadly Wittgensteinian thought, it makes no sense to question 
or to criticize a practice as a whole in terms that owe their meaning to that 
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practice.30 For Wittgenstein (specifically, the Wittgenstein of On Certainty) society, 
as nature, establishes the framework. What is critical about Strawson’s 
displacement of nature for society is that the latter implies a social process that 
occurs by way of “our learning, from childhood up, an activity, a practice, a social 
practice—of making judgements, of forming beliefs.”31 The crypto-propositions 
within this social framework reflect the general character of the practice itself, 
forming a frame within which the judgments we actually make hang together in 
a coherent modality due to the competence of a community of social agents.  
Strawson arrives at a position he calls “social naturalism,” whereby the 
reasoning behind our commitments need no justification in the face of 
determinism because they are linked to both our natural psychological limitations 
and the role the commitments play.32 Furthermore, since it is true of everyone, 
we can know in advance that being determined is not a reason to exempt and the 
objective attitude. Unlike Kant, Strawson does not think that our moral 
standards, themselves, are intractable. Moral reason is diachronic and, in turn, 
our reactive attitudes develop and can be contested via reflection. Reflection 
allots our standards of regard progressive development and, more broadly, 
proffers a criteria for re-identifying the concepts of objects, allowing for 
amendments within the objective world; Strawson’s scheme is subject to the 
limitation that change must be consistent with the possibility of applying those 
concepts and criteria in experience.33 The unconditional nature of Kant’s moral 
“ought” is reconciled by Strawson’s metaphysics of morals—despite standards of 
regard do not exist in space and time, the status of ideas become sovereign-as-
process, with time rendered sensible as we become conscious of the in-itself 
thanks to the incompleteness to our ethical system. 
For Strawson, participating in our ordinary reactive attitudes means that we 
do not simply take an external evaluative view of ourselves and others, instead 
we judge the participants themselves rather than their desirability or utility; 
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however, as Thomas Nagel remarks, try as we might, the “external view” impels 
itself upon us while we resist it: “[o]ne way this occurs is through the gradual 
erosion of what we do by the subtraction of what happens.”34 Reflection, poised 
within mankind’s scientific project, helps us better understand the terms of our 
relating—it reveals to us the principles actually at work. It is not that we should 
conclude that we have been in error all along about the nature of our freedom 
when we are tasked with revising our reasons for exempting in the face of novel 
scientific/ethical discoveries. Rather, via rational reflection, we can refine 
standards, improve practices, and supply rules. Kant did not offer a fluid picture 
of interpersonal relating, and Strawson remedies this as discoveries illuminate 
new facts about our ways of relating—if we discover an inconsistency, we have 
discovered a point at which reason qua reflection has revealed that we are wrong 
about the principles at work in our practice. Moral principles, construed along 
this naturalist axis, are of our own making. 
In Individuals Strawson recalls Kant’s argumentation about the mutuality of 
self and world, concluding that any apperceptive discursive intelligence is 
engaged in representing a world and, thus, necessarily represents the contents of 
that world “categorically”—that is, as systematically interrelated and as existing 
independently of their being represented. In The Bounds of  Sense, Strawson carves 
a sceptic ones again, this time challenging us to reconstruct a public world of 
physical objects and events via nothing but private sense-data to evince justified 
belief in the objective world by working outwards—in contradistinction to 
concepts of sense-data, concepts of objects are necessarily compendia of causal 
law. Strawson’s objective realism returns to the question of how limitations 
between order and regularity must be reflected “in the character of our concepts 
themselves.”35 “Freedom and Resentment” applies the logic of Strawson’s 
constitutive realism to a social scheme. More broadly, Strawson’s naturalized 
Kantianism offers that, although our independence from the physical world does 
not appear when we consider ourselves as merely empirical subjects, it is 
nonetheless true of us as we are in ourselves.  
Just as identification occupies the evaluative fulcrum for Strawson’s 
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progressive picture of morality, his causal picture of objective reference offers a 
theory of differentiating physical particulars via contextual, demonstrative 
relations. We will see how Gareth Evans eventually draws from this interpretation 
of Kant, particularly Strawson’s linking perceptual representation of physical 
entities in conceptualizing objective realism. As Tyler Burge notes, however, this 
also opens the door for considerable conceptual error, reducing the problem of 
explaining “minimum conditions on experience of objective reality to the 
problem of explaining necessary conditions on our conception of the relation 
between perceptions and their objects an aspect of the problem of explaining our 
conception of objectivity.”36  
 
IV 
Wilfrid Sellars’s reality theory of knowledge, imbued with a process monist 
ontology, proffers a notion of judgment via an inferentialist framework. Like 
Strawson, Sellars emphasizes sensory re-afference, where reasoning does not 
involve solely the innate structures in the mind but a space of dialogical 
interactions—a logical “space of reasons” of justifying or being able to justify 
one’s stance. Sellars’ “naturalized Kantianism” avows the irreducibility of 
epistemological explanation, while reconciling it with prospects for a genuine 
materialism. Such is the basis of Sellars’ transcendental materialism, which 
distinguishes the epistemic and ontological dimensions involved in accounting for 
the cognitive and sensory mediations between subject and world. Sellars 
simultaneously resists the correlationist delimitation of knowledge to appearances 
and absolutizing the sensible as much as the Platonist solution of reifying the 
direct ontological purchase of formal vocabularies against natural languages and 
the endowments of the sensible. Sellars’ project thus endeavors to define a 
hierarchy of cognition within a representational and realist register, accounting 
for how the intelligible dimension of thought in its conceptual and structural 
dimensions abstracts itself from intuition. This means explaining how the 
intelligible develops from the sensible faculties as part of an informational 
dynamics through which nature is progressively disclosed to thinking. The 
representational relation between thinking and being is neither to be understood 
in terms of a semantic relationship between conceptual states nor in terms of a 
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qualitative resemblance between propositions and the world. Rather, Sellars 
argues, the logical order structurally constitutes a nomological double or map of 
its environment, such that an isomorphism or homomorphism can be drawn 
between the expressions of a language or theory and the basic constituents of the 
world as progressively represented by empirical science. This entails 
distinguishing between proprieties in the conceptual order and those of the 
propositional order, without thereby falling into a dualist picture that renders the 
relation between the two unintelligible. 
Denying a representationalist theory of the relation between thinking and 
being is not to deny that representation is a phenomenon to explain. Sellars helps 
us conceive of the possibility of avoiding the metaphysical excess and skeptical 
consequences of Kant’s transcendental project without absolutizing the 
conditions of experience into the mechanisms of nature as a whole, nor 
relinquishing the project of positive epistemology or ontology as a whole: to be 
worthy of a belief, individual perceptual beliefs hold warrant only insofar as they 
infer further beliefs about sensory experience and a sign’s reliability. Sellars’ 
reconstruction of Kant via Peirce involves the resuscitation of the concept of 
noumena within a pragmatic register, refashioning noumenal reality as a 
regulative ideal which orients the historicity of science as a self-correcting 
enterprise, but which allow us to assess how, diachronically speaking, theories 
converge toward a specific limit. This project not only re-orients the formal 
sciences but engages in a dialectic by virtue of which we arrive at a self-
conception of ourselves and nature—one that includes how we try to explain our 
place in nature. As Strawson notes, while notions such as “universal, concept, 
type” exist solely as objects of thought, “thought, thinking, is certainly a natural 
process, something that takes place in nature, has causes and effects.”37 Like 
Strawson, Sellars prods Kant’s noumena into experience, with science 
progressively getting closer to the mapping of a mind-independent reality—a 
regulative ideal in relation to which we can put ideas in concession. Thus, “[t]he 
conceptual distinction between what is, and what isn’t but yet is possible, is 
relevant to and relative to each concrete system.”38 
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One of Sellars’ most cited contributions to the analysis of the “Science of 
Structures” is his critique of the Myth of the Given.39 The “given” is the 
immediate presentation of sense-data, is neither a product of inference nor 
presupposing any other knowledge while offering indefeasible empirical 
information the physical environment. Sellars is adamant that the privileged 
status of “any one history” must “be a status which stems from outside the 
Conceptual Realm and which consequently cannot be penetrated by the a priori 
Science of Structures”40—within our “Conceptual Realm” no concrete system or 
family of concrete systems has a privileged position. Thus, Sellars’ critique entails 
that there is no “pre-theoretical” foundation of knowledge waiting for us once we 
have “bracketed” naturalist or metaphysical commitments. However, Sellars goes 
further than this anti-foundationalist gesture, arguing that the vocabulary of 
subjective experience is a conceptual achievement, and one which is 
epistemologically dependent upon our capacity to describe the world and its 
constituents in an objective mode. The “manifest image of man in the world” as 
an intentional agent that mediates its overt behavior by way of experiential 
episodes thereby constitutes a development over what Sellars names the “original 
image,” in which man as much as nature were conceived in broadly animistic and 
behaviorist terms, while lacking psychological or phenomenological vocabulary.41 
The “manifest image of man in the world” is a byproduct of postulating inner 
episodes as the mediating causes of overt action that we use to explain human 
behavior. These psychological, internal episodes are introspectible and remain 
observable to the agents that bear them. Acts of introspection are thus understood 
analogically to extrospectible perceptual acts.  
The emergence of the manifest image which inaugurates the “framework of 
persons” is coincident with a “de-personalization” of the rest of the world.42 In 
this regard, Sellars argues, “the manifest image” is already a kind of “scientific 
image,” insofar as it proceeds by theoretically introducing new kinds of entities: 
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internal episodes. The manifest image seeks to explain behavior qua mind by 
attending to the relations between two different kinds of observable states of 
affairs: extrospectible physical events and introspectable psychological episodes. 
In contrast, the emergence of the scientific image depends on the postulation of 
unobservables as causes for the relations between observables. The arrival of the 
scientific image proper from the manifest image involves an additional step, 
flattening man onto nature by depersonalizing man itself, assimilating operations 
to an objective framework of physical-causal explanations that dispense with the 
“folk-psychology” of intentions altogether. While the scientific image emerges 
from the concepts elaborated within the manifest image, Sellars insists, it also 
presents itself as a rival image, such that to the extent that the manifest image 
does not survive, “man himself ” will not survive.43 
In reconciling this transcendental naturalist and realist project with a 
historical conception of scientific cognition, the distinction between the 
epistemological and metaphysical orders of explanation also reveals a dialectical 
intrication. For the scientific and manifest images are diachronically coordinated, 
such that the former appears as an elaboration of the latter: 
[S]cience is continuous with common sense, and the ways in which the scientist 
seeks to explain empirical phenomena are refinements of the ways in which plain 
men, however crudely and schematically, have attempted to understand their 
environment and their fellow men since the dawn of intelligence.44 
Sellars’ progressive self-correction—which contemporaries of Sellars such as 
Brandom and McDowell have tethered to the Hegelian project of diachronic 
practices and concepts, respectively—is analogous to that which Strawson 
similarly took up with his consideration of compatibilist determinism (re: freedom 
and morality) qua interpersonal relating. This tradition emphasizes assessing 
reasons for actions and thought by naturalizing the relation and reasoning 
between self-consciousness and an object-referent. Brandom preserves some 
basic, non-modal, purely sensory-perceptual notion of observation and 
McDowell, even when acknowledging that our perceptual capacities are fallible, 
insists that this generic fallibility is compatible with distributive infallibility 
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regarding non-defective perceptual episodes.45  
The view that reasons which support knowledge must be propositional, 
wherein reason is fundamentally a faculty of a priori principles, recalls Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s strategy was to argue that, in postulating that 
synthetic a priori judgements are possible, we offer the claim that empirical 
objects fall under pure concepts of the understanding, which is justified because 
objects of experience would not be presented as objects in the first place unless 
the manifold of perceptual input from which we derive our representations of 
objects in the world had been ordered according to a priori concepts of the 
understanding. It is a priori true that those concepts are veridical for objects of 
experience; in any given case, we have to rely on empirical investigation to 
determine which empirical objects fall under which categories. Via the 
Transcendental Deduction, we know a priori that all empirically given objects 
fall under one or the other of each “title” of the categories (quantity, quality, 
relation, modality).  
Reflection can help us better understand the terms of our relating, revealing 
to us the principles actually at work. Tasked with revising our reasons for 
exempting in the face of novel scientific/ethical discoveries we, via rational 
reflection, can refine standards, improve practices, and supply rules. Sellars 
typologizes the different kinds of transitions invoked by cognition in a robust 
manner, so as to account, for example, for which kinds of language-entry 
transitions obtain besides perceptual responses to sensory signals and direct 
somatic stimulation. Many of these capacities involve the kinds of capacities 
associated with memory and the imagination already identified by Kant. Just as 
it possible to abstract the functional role of a given concept from its specific 
syntactic-linguistic expression, we can abstract the generic functional capacities 
involved in cognition from their modes of implementation. This leads to a more 
nuanced way to understand the “conditions of experience” that Kant associates 
with our aesthetic and intellectual faculties as part of a natural and cultural 
history, complicating the relationship between the empirical and the 
transcendental. For while the generic function of “the space of reasons” is defined 
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a priori, with invariant capacities across all material mediums, languages, and 
cultures, it is also the product of contingent selections in natural history, subject 
also to indefinitely varied cultural-historical reconfigurations: 
The idea that this logical space is an evolutionary development, culturally 
inherited, is an adaptation rather than a rejection of Kant’s contention that the 
forms of experience are a priori and innate … his conception of the forms of 
experience was too narrow, and that non-formal patterns of [material] inference 
are as essential to the conceptual order as are the patterns explored by formal 
logic.46 
Just like the concepts, vocabularies, and theories that furnish the mind are to 
be historicized, so the “forms of intuition” that furnish the bedrock of our sensory 
receptivity must be understood in a dual sense. For while in one sense these 
designate a functional set of invariant capacities by virtue of which a system 
represents its environment, in another sense they comprise a set of system-specific 
modalities which, while invariant across a species or system’s classes, are 
nevertheless the products of natural evolutionary history. “Transcendental” 
determinations cannot simply be reduced to empirical or contingent-historical 
ones; in turn, we must separate two levels of transcendental determination 
pertaining to the forms of experience: (1) Hard transcendental constraints pertaining 
to the invariant and necessary functional capacities required as a priori conditions 
for cognition, irrespective of its forms of implementation in specific material-
linguistic mediums. (2) Soft transcendental constraints pertaining to the invariant 
implementation of these generic functional capacities in a given class of cognitive 
systems that are contingent products of natural-cultural history, and which may 
be subject to variation, revision and intervention.  
For Sellars, perception is defeasible, as reasons are construed as necessarily 
propositional and perception is non-propositional—it plays no normative role in 
knowledge. Thus, all epistemic warrant derives through propositional inferences 
from propositional attitudes. Causally prompted by non-conceptual inputs, 
perception is a linguistically mediated capacity for Sellars, in which such inputs 
are incorporated into a discursive economy, becoming liable to inferential uses. 
To say of any episode that it counts as an instance of knowledge is not to describe 
it in an empirical mode or to index its causal origin, but to place it in a 
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justificatory network of implications, by virtue of which a cognitive system enters 
the logical “space of reasons” of “justifying and being able to justify what one 
says.”47 Presupposing the receptivity of sensation via non-linguistic inputs as a 
necessary condition, to perceive something “as something” involves binding 
labeling responses to sensory stimuli, producing counterfactually robust 
inferential relations of incompatibility and consequence: 
For while one does not have the concept of red until one has directly perceived 
something as red, the coming to see something as red is the culmination of a 
complicated process which is the slow building up of a multi-dimensional pattern 
of linguistic responses (by verbal expressions to things, by verbal expressions to 
verbal expressions, by meta-linguistic expressions to object-language expressions, 
etc.) the fruition of which as conceptual occurs when all these dimensions come 
into play in such direct perceptions as that this physical object (not that one) over 
here (not over there) is (rather than was) red (not orange, yellow, etc.) [...] the direct 
perception of physical objects is mediated by the occurrence of sense impressions 
which latter are, in themselves, thoroughly non-cognitive [...] this mediation is 
causal rather than epistemic.48 
For Sellars, just because perceptual reports are non-inferentially prompted in 
relation to non-conceptual sensory inputs, they are not exempt from epistemic 
challenge. Indeed, as Sellars shows, we cannot via mere sensory inspection 
ascertain the causal structure of any material particular, nor of any of its manifest 
features. However, this does not entail that its manifest features are merely 
occurrent rather than dispositional causal characteristics.49 Observational 
concepts which are used to make non-inferential perceptual reports are every bit 
as liable to assessment and revision as any theoretical concepts. While 
observational concepts “ground” empirical knowledge insofar as they articulate 
conceptual responses to environmental data coming from sensation, this does not 
mean that those concepts are “given” in the sense of foundational items that are 
epistemically dependent or apodictic. The difference between the observational 
and the theoretical is methodological rather than ontological: concepts that only 
have theoretical, inferential uses may eventually acquire observational ones, 
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without implying that what the concepts designate or describe changes.  
[T]o reject the myth of the given is not to commit oneself to the idea that empirical 
knowledge as it is now constituted has no rock bottom level of observation 
predicates proper. It is to commit oneself rather to the idea that even if it does have 
a rock bottom level, it is still in principle replaceable by another conceptual 
framework in which these predicates do not, strictly speaking, occur.50 
Tracing the porosity between the observable and the unobservable is crucial 
to understanding how conceptual construction guides the historical development 
of Sellars’ so-called “scientific image,” and its development from the “manifest 
image.” As Sellars put it, the behavior of representational systems must exhibit 
the functional structure of what he calls “Humean” orientation systems, which 
associate their representings in accordance with logical rules for conjunction (co-
presence), disjunction (negation), and quantification (measurement).51 This 
navigational scheme fulfills the general functions of reference and 
characterization required for individuating represented items.  
In its functional and pragmatic basis, Sellars accounts for representation as 
more primitive than consciousness or intentionality, even if representing is 
augmented by the acquisition of sensing and language. Sellars indeed provides us 
with a meaningful way to understand a sapient system’s discursively mediated use 
of theoretical reasonings to describe their worlds and themselves. However, we 
reject Sellars’ claim that reasons are the only source of epistemic warrant and that 
perceptual beliefs without reasons cannot be epistemically warranted—warrants 
for perceptual belief consist partially in an individual’s being in perceptual states 
which reliably figure in the formation of true beliefs, even if they are not reason-
giving:  
An animal with visual perceptions of, and as of, bodies cannot ‘make sense’ of the 
reference. It need not have reasons. It need not know any criterion for being a body: 
it is enough that the animal be able to discriminate and track bodies by visual 
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perception.52 
Animals, children, and many adults lack reasons for their perceptual beliefs 
but are often warranted in having them epistemically entitled to them. To be in 
a contentful state just is to be in a state of a certain specific representational kind. 
Perceptual representational content sets veridicality conditions or, more 
specifically, accuracy conditions—"accuracy” distinguishes perception’s 
conditions from truth conditions, which are propositional. The fundamental 
point about perceptual states is that they, and hence their representational 
contents, can be accurate or inaccurate, within some range of approximation. 
“Egocentric indexes,” representing particulars that are not perceived, mark the 
present time, the origin or anchor of a spatial framework, or the believer—thus 
a believer’s referring depends on the structural framework of the perception or 
perceptual belief.53 Consequently, epistemological warrants ought not be confined to reasons—perceptual 
content grounds much propositional content. 
 With regard to Sellars’ inferentialist explanation of discursive intentionality, 
his stripe of functionalism concerns itself with the role that mental states play as 
part of a system of relations. Sellars’ essential break with Kant comes in noticing 
that the introduction of such theoretical postulates need not imply existential 
commitment to an ontologically distinct domain of entities or “things” in relation 
to the observational domain, which would split noumenal reality from 
phenomenal appearing. Sellars deals with attitude-ascriptions and how they 
bolster the ability to explain the conditions for the realization or failure of 
epistemic and volitional acts that bind agents to their environments, anticipating 
the postulation of theoretical unobservables as the causes of observables. 
Similarly, Kant’s postulation of the noumenal “thing-in-itself ” begins by 
introducing a theoretical “thought-entity”—knowledge which is only 
inferentially licensed, on whose basis one explains the origin of observable 
phenomena. The naturalized noumena uncloaks itself in influencing our 
reasoning: diachronic in both Strawson’s conception of ordinary reactive attitudes 
and Sellars’ conceptual licensing. However, as mentioned above, Sellars makes a 
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grave error, conflating sensory registration with perception and, therefore, hastily 
dismissing the epistemological warrant of non-propositional representation. 
Sellars fallaciously presumes that representation depends on the knowledge of 
conditions for representation. Longuenesse remedies Sellars’ erring by conceding 
epistemic warrant to the perceptual input(s) from which we derive our 
representations of objects while, simultaneously, prioritizing the more 
fundamental role of ordering- and binding-representations according to a priori 
conditions via the synthesis of apperception—the synthesis that yields 
experience.54 
V 
Reading Kant, Béatrice Longuenesse’s metaphysical stipulation is that 
consciousness in the rational unity of our thinking is more fundamental than 
consciousness of our proprioceptive body—being attentive to the rational unity 
of content(s) in one’s thinking is what makes it possible to assess the standpoints 
from which we initially formulate, and then arrive at, shared universal 
conclusions. Two dichotomies transpire: singular/universal and bodily/rational. What 
is radically individual in what we assert of ourselves is what is true of us as an 
entity individuated in space and time—existence as a material organism. 
However, with the apperceptive “I think” and the moral “I ought to” we assert 
the exercise of capacities that, by principle, we share universally. It is not that 
when we use the first-person “I” it is not indexical, for it still refers to an 
individuated entity: with “I think,” if I am correct to say that there are “users” of 
“I,” such that “I” am the thinker of “I think,” then “I” is still individual. Yet I am 
also asserting something conceptually universal—for Strawson, this universality 
is tethered to our ordinary inter-personal relationships and reactive attitudes but, 
for Longuenesse, it will be expounded through the developmental and 
metapsychological structure undergirding the moral “I ought to.”  
For Kant, there is a fundamental difference between the self-consciousness 
proper to the thinking subject in the course of their thinking and the 
consciousness of themselves as an embodied object in the world. It follows that 
what Kant means by consciousness of  oneself  as a thinking subject is not and cannot, as 
Quassim Cassam claims, be reduced to consciousness of oneself as a physical 
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entity, despite it is intimately connected with the consciousness one has of one’s 
own body (viz. proprioception).55 In the Strawsonian tradition, Kant’s claim that 
the self can be known as object, but not as subject, has been criticized for 
neglecting the essential role of the body/embodiment. Strawson provided 
individual representationalist arguments for thinking that perception 
constitutively depends for representing physical reality on propositional 
thought—that objective empirical representation of physical, environmental 
particulars cannot stand on its own, among an individual’s representations, and 
must be derived from and embedded in other sorts of representations available 
in the individual’s psychology. Contra Sellars, Strawson saw perceptual 
demonstrative reference as based on perception of physical objects, not sense 
data. Just as Cassam argues that awareness of oneself as a physical object is 
necessary to ground self-consciousness, Evans, following Strawson, proposes that 
the body is necessary to ground any referential use of “I,” including the self-
ascription of mental states.56  
Drawing from Wittgenstein’s Blue Book and Sydney Shoemaker’s 
reinterpretation, this tradition involves bifurcating two uses of “I”: “I” as object 
and of “‘I” as subject.”57 Following Wittgenstein, all uses of “I” as object depend 
on identity statements (e.g., “I have a tattoo on my forearm”). Here, knowing the 
predicate to be true of someone is not, ipso facto, knowing it to be true of oneself, 
the current believer of the thought or speaker of the corresponding sentence, 
because an intermediate premise that consists in a statement of identity must be 
justified on objective grounds (i.e., “The person with the tattoo on their forearm 
= I”). With judgments in which “I” is used as subject (e.g., “I think”), Wittgenstein 
posits the self-ascription of psychological predicates. Following this use of “I,” no 
recognitional capacity, intermediate premise, or criterion of identification is in 
play in order to determine whom the predicate is true of, unlike “I” as object. 
According to Shoemaker’s amendment, judgments in which “I” is used as 
subject are characterized not by the fact that they are not about a particular 
embodied person but by the fact that they are immune to error through 
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misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. This involves inside-
knowledge: knowledge of predicates one asserts to be true of oneself on the basis 
of a kind of information not available as the basis for knowledge of others’ states.58 
Perceiving by way of thinking is here a state of  awareness—i.e., epiphenomenal 
qualia, the “what-it’s-like-for-the-subject-of-thinking.”59 Evans also upholds that 
the body is necessary to ground any referential use of “I,” including the self-
ascription of mental states—"I-thoughts,” or self-consciousness about oneself as 
the subject of thought and action, require the self-ascription of some of our bodily 
states to be so immune. Evans’ interpretation propounds the Fundamental 
Reference Rule, according to which the essence of self-consciousness is self-
reference: “‘I’ is a word or concept that refers […] to the author of the thought 
or the speaker of the sentence in which ‘I’ is being used.”60 G.E.M. Anscombe’s 
work on reflective self-consciousness defends the view that “I” never has 
referential use. For Anscombe, “I” is neither a name nor another kind of 
expression whose logical rule is to make reference at all.61 That is, “I” is a non-
referential term that predicates the reflexivity of the activity of thinking—
espousing Anscombe’s position, “I”-thoughts are not thoughts about a particular 
object named by “I” or to which “'I' refers; rather, they are unmediated examples 
of reflective consciousness (of states, actions, movements, etc.) of the body. 
Burge shows, contra Evans and Strawson, that genuine spatial content and 
singular reference via the first-person “I” are distinct. Egocentric indexes occur 
in perception but first-person concepts, which are constitutively associated with 
propositional thought, do not. Evans accounts for the proper epistemic 
requirements in using “I” elides the activity of combining representations—how 
the referent “I” is made available to cognizing subjects. Whether “I” is a use of 
“I” as subject or “I” as object, Kant’s Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
(TUA) enumerates a common ground: “the unity of self-consciousness that makes 
possible both our synthesizing representations into conceptualizable wholes […] 
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and our ascribing thoughts to ourselves in the proposition “I think.”62 Countering 
the Cartesian cogito argument of “self ” as thinking-identity, Longuenesse 
defends that in cases of “I think” nothing is necessary to competently use the first-
person pronoun “I” aside from mastery, implicit or explicit, of the Fundamental 
Reference Rule (the “thinker-rule”).  
On one hand, “I” refers to the producer of the thought. However, the 
predicate attributed to “I” produces a kind of consciousness of self that is the basis 
of making a statement where “I” is indicated, which references embodied 
consciousness (“I am running”), thinking (“I think the proof is valid”), or both (“I 
see a magnolia”). When I say, “I think this proof is valid,” there is nothing beyond 
my being engaged in that thought that makes the predicate valid.63 Consequently, 
all uses of “I,” even uses of “I” as object, depend at least in part on the kind of 
information on which the uses of “I” as subject depend. This infallibilism 
regarding cognitive justification ties epistemology to metaphysical realism, 
proscribing any first-order appeal to logically contingent empirical premises other 
than those pertaining to first-person reports of appearances to oneself and, 
simultaneously, constructing justification outside of access internalism by 
prioritizing first-person cognizance, awareness, and the relevant justificatory 
factors to any predicate at issue. 
Longuenesse here challenges Sellars, who contends that the actual existence 
of individuals is privy to recognizance solely because our sensory states, our 
thoughts, and our language are structured by functional counterparts to 
individuals, their attributes and our experiences of them.64 Consider uses of “I” 
as subject (e.g., “I have tooth-ache,” “I am angry,” “I see red”), where the content 
of the relevant state is conceptually articulated into propositions, and the thinker 
of the propositions thereby thinks of themselves, the thinker and speaker, as the 
entity of which the relevant predicate is true. The concept “I” presupposes the 
exercise of the capacity for unifying and conceptualizing mental contents, as 
outlined by Kant’s TUA, which demonstrates how the analytic unity of 
apperception is necessary for any empirically determinate self-conscious 
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experience. For Longuenesse, the very exercise of this capacity is conceptually 
expressed in the proposition “I think.” Satisfying the reference-rule for “I” calls 
for nothing more than being, in any instance of the use of “I,” awareness of  one’s 
being engaged in thinking. This is the case despite, in many uses of “I,” the predicate 
that is self-ascribed is a predicate referring to some bodily property.  
Consciousness of oneself as thinking is, as a matter of empirical fact rather 
than as a matter of a priori argument, intimately connected to awareness of one’s 
own body. This is a lesson we draw out from Kant’s Transcendental Deduction 
of the Categories and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. In the Transcendental 
Deduction, Kant develops an analysis of the type of self-consciousness grounding 
the proposition “I think” and the role of “I” in that proposition.65 Parrying with 
Descartes’ cogito argument from the Second Mediation, Kant’s Paralogism of 
Substantiality criticizes what he takes to be the fallacious inference by which 
rationalist metaphysicians support their claim that the referent of “I” in “I think” 
is a soul, a thinking substance.66 In the Paralogism of Simplicity, Kant criticizes 
the inference that thinking, like an action, cannot be composite. Thought under 
the first-person standpoint, the entity “I” is conceived to be ‘simple’ (indivisible) 
in virtue of consciousness’ stringing together intentional thoughts as logically 
connected.67 From the objective “third-person” standpoint, the entity referred to 
by “I” may be divisible—a composition of metaphysical subjects. As Longuenesse 
notes, the subjective “I” expresses normative commitment to the unity of thinking 
(its connectedness and consistency) is the representation of “I” by which I refer 
to myself in thinking, a universal condition, “for any thinking being, of being 
engaged in the activity of thinking.”68  
In the Paralogism of Personality, Kant criticizes rationalists for, again, 
engaging in a fallacy of equivocation.69 For rationalist metaphysics, as thinking 
beings we are immediately aware of our own numerical identity at different times 
and, as such, we are persons. Kant argues that we are aware of our own numerical 
identity at different times not in virtue of mere thinking (thinking “I think”), but 
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insofar as we, as thinking beings, are capable of consciousness of our continued 
existence as spatiotemporal, empirically given, embodied entities. Accordingly, 
Kant offers resources for developing a positive notion of persons as embodied 
entities endowed with the unity of apperception. Yet this third-person objective 
standpoint is embedded in the more fundamental first-person standpoint. 
Notably, this is not the conclusion Kant draws from his criticism but one 
Longuenesse teases out and, thus, the center of our Kantian infallibilism: 
Longuenesse denies that the consciousness of the numerical identity of any entity, 
including oneself, is possible for us other than by relying on criteria for identifying 
and re-identifying ourselves as that entity in space and time.  
Longuenesse’s Kantian infallibilism can be naturalized. Vis-à-vis empirical 
cases such as Oliver Sacks’ “disembodied lady” and scenarios of deafferented 
patients, we see the order of logical connection when it comes to the relationship 
between proprioceptive consciousness of one’s own body and the consciousness 
of oneself as a self, an entity that counts as the referent of “I” whenever “I” is used 
by that entity.70 Consider Christina’s case: 
Following an antibiotic treatment in preparation for a relatively minor surgery, 
Christina started gradually losing the sense of her own body. She could stand only 
if she looked down at her feet and hold things only if she kept her eyes fixed on her 
hands. She reported that she could not feel her body any more. It was as if the 
parietal lobes of her brain were not processing the sensory information from her 
body. In fact, tests showed that the parietal lobes were working, but they had no 
information to work with. She […] in a state of total proprioceptive deficit, going 
from the tips of her toes to her head. The diagnosis was one of acute polyneuritis, 
not the one known as the Guillain-Barré syndrome, which affects motricity, but a 
version that affected the proprioceptive fibers only. Christina undertook to 
compensate for the loss of proprioception by using vision to monitor the movements 
of her body. As a result, her vision automatism and reflexes were increasingly 
integrated and fluent.71 
Christina, having lost all sensations of movement and position-sense below 
the face area, reports being unable to control her movements and thus less “in 
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her body.”72 The loss of proprioception requires Christina to acquire information 
from vision and use it to control and correct her movements. Christina’s 
experience of self-location is not the third-person embodied experience as a 
physical entity; she experiences herself as a bearer of a point of view that can 
locate her body in space, for it cannot locate itself. The self-ascription of visual 
experience and self-location is immune to error through misidentification relative 
to the first-person pronoun, her body experienced as hers only through the 
mediation of deliberate evaluation of its position as an object she sees rather than 
feels. When she stops monitoring her own posture/body, she becomes slumped, 
a ragdoll-like state. When Christina refers to herself as “I,” she engages with a 
kind of unity that allows her to string together perceptual information, engage in 
inferential reasoning, and keep rational control over her actions. Thus, despite 
Christina has lost, along with her proprioception, the “fundamental organic 
mooring of identity”—the “body-ego”—she nonetheless uses perception as an 
“I.”73  
Thus the “I” in the first-person “I think” serves to bind objective 
representations to come up with concepts, combined in judgments, connected in 
inferential patterns. Christina’s perceptual representation is subsumed under the 
concept of the first-person “I.” Following Kant, perceptual knowledge, however 
elementary, depends on mental capacities having complex a priori structures. 
Intuitions, as percepts are conceptualized, synthesized to yield experience. The 
transcendental unity, a process on which justification of oneself as “I” depends, is 
“the work of imagination, a blind though indispensable function of the soul, 
without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom 
even conscious;”74 notably, there is no phenomenal consciousness of this activity. 
Since there is no intentional consciousness—the facet of consciousness that 
confers an object to phenomenal reports, i.e., that what this phenomenal 
consciousness is consciousness of—of this synthesizing activity of the imagination, 
it is unlike both the higher-order mental activity that differentiates intentional 
objects under concepts and the “what it is like” of lower-order phenomenal 
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consciousness. Indeed, we are conscious of this binding activity mostly through 
its results.75  
There are, thus, two orders of consciousness: i) a fundamental qualitative 
“what it is like” where consciousness is a property of representational states; ii) a 
higher-order consciousness, “a representation that another representation is in 
me,” by way of which we represent the identities and differences of objects in 
space and time, where these representational states can, themselves, become 
objects of representation, insofar as we are conscious of having them.76 As 
Longuenesse notes, “[t]his higher-order consciousness depends on the merely 
qualitative consciousness … the ‘what it’s like for the subject of the representation’ 
character of sensations.”77 This distinction between a representation’s being 
conscious by virtue of being qualitatively or phenomenally present and its being 
conscious by virtue of being conceptualized is comparable to Ned Block’s 
distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.  
Whether cognition has its own phenomenology of thought or whether the 
phenomenology of cognition is entirely perceptual remains central to Block’s 
query. For Block, perception is not linguistic in form but iconic (i.e., picture-like) 
and, thus, we have to understand how a picture-like representation could be a 
conscious representation. Phenomenal consciousness, or “P-consciousness,” as 
Block calls it, is experience and what makes a state phenomenally conscious is 
that there is something “it is like” to be in that perceptual state.78 Originally, Block 
considered access consciousness, or “A-consciousness”—the aspect of 
consciousness that plays a role in cognitive life (thinking, noticing, etc.) using the 
perceptual information of P-consciousness for reasoning and control of action—
in virtue of one’s having the state, if a representation of its content is: i) inferentially 
poised for use as a premise in reasoning, ii) poised for rational control of action, 
and iii) poised for “rational control of speech.”79 Access consciousness was 
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accounted for partly in terms of poise and partly in terms of attention. Thus, P-
consciousness without A-consciousness can exist, as when we recognize that we 
had been aware all along of the humming of the refrigerator only once it stops.  
After Burge’s “modal objection”—which argues that it is objectionable that 
any sort of consciousness could be thought of as dispositional in the way that 
Block suggests—Block eventually dropped the poise definition in favor of a model 
more akin to the “global workspace theory of consciousness” which requires 
representation rather than either the mental state or the subject who is in the 
state to have the features mentioned in the previous definition.[85] Notably, 
however, Block does not endorse Bernard Baars’ global workspace model tout 
court. Block originally theorized access consciousness such that for any subject S 
and any psychological state X of S, this state X is an access conscious state of S if 
and only if X is poised for use by S in the rational control of S’s thought and 
action. Block’s revision offers that for any subject S and any psychological state X 
of S, X is an access conscious state if and only if X consists in a representation 
that is globally broadcast for free use in the rational control of thought and action. 
Indeed, this notion of “broadcasting” is ineliminably tethered to Baars’ theory of 
communal processing and Dennett’s notion of consciousness as cerebral celebrity, 
where information is global not only along the functional register but also 
anatomically, where cognitive information is distributed throughout the cortex 
and other brain areas. However, Block also brings to bear the representational 
nature of intention—the central nexus of this broadcasting being world-involving, 
affordance-detecting, and action-guiding representation. What is critical is that a 
state, S, is access conscious if it consists in a representation that has this sort of global 
cognitive property. Following Block’s replacement, what is critical is not that a 
representation can be broadcast for free use but that it is actually being used by 
some system and, thus, is linked to picture-thinking: A-consciousness may 
necessarily entail p-consciousness, however, if, as Block has said elsewhere, for a 
percept to have a certain phenomenal character is for it to have a certain 
representational content.  
With this revision, A-consciousness refers to the global availability of the 
information in an experience and is dispositional (and dispositionally distributed) 
while P-consciousness is occurrent. The question arises where, as a result of this 
replacement, A-consciousness can occur in a zombie: e.g., a philosophical zombie 
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lays their hand on the stove and the panging heat, distributed as described above, 
causes the zombie to turn their hand away from the oven, all the while not feeling 
the “what its likeness” of pain. Considering the possibility of representations that 
are poised for report but that are not phenomenally conscious and so not 
conscious in any conceptual sense, Block notes: 
What I would say now is that one has a choice in framing a definition of 
A consciousness. One can adopt a pure information-processing notion 
and face the fact that since it will categorize a zombie functional duplicate 
as conscious, it will not accord with many people’s intuitions about the 
term. Or one could in effect require P consciousness for some states of an 
individual who has an A conscious state, thereby framing a notion that 
fits the ordinary role of the sense of consciousness that emphasizes 
function.80 
Regardless of which version one chooses, it is clear that while A-consciousness 
may functionally be linked to percepts, it is not equipollent to picturing; rather, it 
is poise guided by intentional relating (intentional relating captures information-
registration without necessitating attention or awareness). Although A-
consciousness originally was analogous to the Kantian conception of higher-order 
consciousness—an intentional mental state where representations are reflected 
under a concept for judgment, allowing for reportability—the information-
processing interpretation offers A-consciousness as a cognitive successor-concept 
to Longuenesse’s understanding of the apperceptive “I” (behind “I think”), the 
egocentric index grounding the unconscious binding or synthesizing activity of 
the imagination. Subjective experience can be understood as a broad category 
and consciousness as a narrower category within it—the binding that Kant speaks 
of we, today, might refer to via the “global workspace” that maps onto Blocks 
information-processing conception of A-consciousness. It follows that content is 
conscious once it enters the global neural workspace, where it gains the capacity 
to be broadcast to a host of higher-level cognitive systems for executive control, 
motor control, reportability, and so on. This strategy helps us pinpoint the 
mechanism in Christina’s brain that endows perceptual content with a set of 
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properties considered central to the perceptual unity necessary for first-person 
cognition’s reference rule. Researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience 
have identified a distributed communication protocol integrating a hierarchy of 
(domain-relative) modular processors with high-level processors endowed with 
long-distance interconnectivity (viz. cortical neurons with long-range axons in the 
prefrontal cortex and parietal regions).81 This networked mechanism located in 
the prefrontal region of the brain is the engine behind first-person cognition, 
performing the function of conscious monitoring and control.  
Although we, donning the physicalist stance, can point to biochemical 
mechanisms in the brain for phenomenal consciousness, our best information 
about where in the brain consciousness happens is that every conscious content is 
processed by the brain-area which processes that kind of information. We know 
that conscious contents of motion have to do with the actions in the Medial 
Temporal area of the visual cortex and likely involve reciprocal connections to 
the lower visual area. Similarly, conscious appreciation of faces has to do with 
activation of the fusiform face area in the bottom of the right temporal lobe. Yet 
we have no “place” or unified network for pinning down phenomenal 
consciousness although we do understand that P-consciousness is not an 
intentional property while, simultaneously, intentional differences can make a P-
conscious difference.82  
Facing the impasse that P-conscious difference meets when faced with the 
hard problem of consciousness, we need not mean embrace Dennett-style weak 
emergentist illusionism (nor need we embrace Chalmers’ strong emergentist 
panpsychism). Of course, the existence of NCCs by itself does not demonstrate 
that illusionism is false—illusionists do not deny that there are conscious 
experiences but deny that phenomenal consciousness is real, i.e., that conscious 
states consist of intrinsically contentful or simple, irreducibly subjective and 
immediately grasped properties. For the illusionist, there are consciousness-type 
experiences but no phenomenal properties and, consequently, the illusionist can 
accept first-person reports about conscious states but not interpretations of those 
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reports that invoke a metaphysics of phenomenal properties Block, like Patricia 
Churchland, offers us a meaningful mode to endorse the theory of neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCC)—there are, indeed, promising experimental 
approaches to NCC that do not rely on subjective reports, such as Doris Tsao’s 
work on macaques.83 Following Block’s program, there exist a variety of 
paradigms in which we can use convergent evidence involving varying degrees 
of access to separate out the Phenomenal from Access NCC (e.g., signal-detection 
theory approaches) without regressing into a “winner-take all” model of a “single 
NCC” paradigm. More broadly, the claim that consciousness is unobservable is 
the kind of folk-philosophical armchair speculation Churchland’s eliminative 
materialism and that Block distinction between a Phenomenal NCC and an 
Access NCC oppose. 
Insofar as the panpsychism is concerned, the panpsychist has to explain how, 
even if they espouse stuff-monism, their fundamental smallest unit of consciousness 
interacts with electrons, magnetic fields, brains, and so on. Does it dissipate when brains 
die? More broadly, the panpsychist has to provide an account for how its minimal unit 
relates to brains, what are its causal properties, and, if it does or does not have mass, 
whether it also has energy. 
Imagine that the panpsychist thus responds with the following argument for 
idealist physical constructivism: 
 
P1: Whatever we have direct perceptual awareness of is radically constructed. 
P2: We have direct perceptual awareness of the physical (our bodies, 
environment). 
C: Therefore, the physical is radically constructed. 
In response, we will, keeping in mind philosophy after Kant and Sellars—
which evinces that to be a direct realist about the external world is fallacious—
reject P1. Our senses are not “literally direct” due to the brain’s preprocessing. 
While our conscious experiences are constructed by the brain’s preprocessing, 
these constructed experiences turn out to be rather predictable maps to the non-
constructed external real world. Given that visual and auditory senses are tightly 
 
83 Doris Y. Tsao, Le Chang, and Pinglei Bao, "The representation of colored objects in macaque color 
patches," Nature communications 8.1 (2017): 1-14; "Representation of multiple objects in macaque category-
selective areas," Nature communications 9.1 (2018): 1-16. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 444 
correlated, when we see someone hit a drum, for instance, we can reasonably be 
sure we are in practical contact with reality.  
Following Block and the late Putnam, we have a rather robust account of a 
Turing-type computational theory of mind complimented by weak 
representationism, according to which for a subject to be intelligent is for the 
subject to instantiate a particular computational property. This offers a 
methodological solution to problem of how intelligence and rationality find a 
place in the physical world by realizing computational properties in physical 
properties, even if they are not reducible to such properties. The right 
computational properties are what makes Block's China-body robot and 
Commander Data intelligent. Block’s functionalist theory of representation 
allows for multiple realizability—so how do beliefs and desires, or states in head 
that realize beliefs and desires, represent certain states of affairs? According to 
Block’s long-arm functionalism, which allows for multiple realizability, the 
representational contents of internal physical states are determined by a 
combination of: i) their relations—usually causal or informational relations—to 
the external relations they represent, and ii) their functional role in producing 
outputs and interacting with each other.84 This is contra the strong 
representationism of Jackson and Bill Brewer, where there is a direct mapping 
between the external objects of the world and these representational states. Thus, 
rejecting P1, even if our conscious experiences are constructed by neural 
preprocessing, they functionally respond to objects in the external environment 
reliably. Accordingly, our constructed experiences end up as reliable maps to the 
non-constructed external real world.  
P-consciousness is experience, P-conscious properties are experiential 
properties, and P-conscious states are experiential states. Since P-consciousness 
differences seemingly make an intentional difference, it requires that we point to 
those empirical experiences (tastes, smells, etc.). Thus the challenge arises for the 
Kantian naturalist:  
[A] realist about phenomenal consciousness should not find first-person 
operationalism any more palatable than third-person operationalism. 
 
84 Ned Block, “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10.1 (1986): 
615—678. 
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Consider the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to reflective 
consciousness…if phenomenal consciousness is reflective consciousness, 
then for the pain to be phenomenally conscious is for there to be a higher-
order thought about the pain, or at least some sort of cognitive state that 
scans it.85  
Block distinguishes P-conscious properties to be distinct from any cognitive, 
intentional, or functional property.86 P-consciousness binds us neither to 
epiphenomenalism nor Cartesian mind-body dualism—quite the opposite, in 
fact, as Block asserts that we can be a physicalist about the cognitive activity 
related to P-consciousness, allotting a naturalist-cum-physicalist account that well 
supplements Longuenesse’s. Sellars’ line of questioning had already opened up 
the question of how do beliefs and desires, or states in the head that realize beliefs 
and desires, represent certain states of affairs? As demonstrated by the 
conceivability of spectral inversion, or the idea that the same object might look 
red to one person but green to another, phenomenal variation is independent of 
how things are represented as being in the world around the perceiver or the way 
the world itself is presented in experience.87 Refining Sellars’ line of thinking, we 
see P-consciousness concepts as “a matter of the causal role of the expression in 
reasoning and deliberation and, in general, in the way the expression combines 
and interacts with other expressions so as to mediate between sensory inputs and 
behavioral outputs.”88  
Kant’s “unity of synthesis” (Verbindung)—the combinatory “act of the 
spontaneity of the power of representation”—opens the question of whether the 
representational format of imagery in the brain is pictorial (iconic) or descriptive 
(discursive).89 Block shows that the representational format of imagery and 
perception in the brain is iconic, opposing that consciousness is reducible to 
 
85 Ned Block, “Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained” in Consciousness, Function and 
Representation, 129—141.  
86 Cognitive = essentially involving thought; intentional properties = properties in virtue of which a 
representation or state is about something; functional properties = e.g., properties definable in terms of a 
computer program. See: Block, “Concepts of Consciousness,” 207. 
87 Ned Block, “Advertisement,” 93. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Kant, CPR, B130. 
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functional organization, representation, or cognitive access.90 The phenomenal 
character of experience cannot be exhausted by such representational contents 
as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and having pains; phenomenal consciousness 
is separable from cognitive access. While cognition (thought, reasoning, problem-
solving) is sparse due to our working memory, actual conscious perception is rich 
due to phenomenal awareness—this shows that conscious perception is at least 
partially distinct from cognition. Such conclusion are further verified by partial-
report superiority experiments, where there is phenomenally conscious 
information that is not necessarily cognitively accessible.91 The separability of the 
neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the 
cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness becomes 
pellucid in Christina’s and other deafferented patients’ being conscious of 
themselves as “I” despite being disembodied and losing cutaneous sensation. 
Other empirical cases include change blindness, where subjects can report the 
details of only a few objects, but subjectively seem to see the entire visual scene 
in front of them. The inattentional accessibility view says that subjects may 
legitimately see features that change but fail to notice the difference because 
although much of the detail in representations is phenomenally registered, “it is 
not conceptualized at a level that allows cognitive access to the difference.”92 As 
indicated by Block’s description of “mental oil,” perceptual experiences have both 
a phenomenal mode of presentation and representational content, in which the 
phenomenal mode does not supervene on the representational content, or vice 
versa.93 This props up Longuenesse’s claim that there is no phenomenal 
consciousness or intentional consciousness characterizing the mental activity of 
binding representations. 
Rejecting this physicalist biological picture, the mind-body dualist, however, 
argues for an interactionist picture. For the substance dualist, immaterial minds, 
outside physical space, causally interact with material objects in space. In the 
 
90 Ned Block, “Mental pictures and cognitive science,” Philosophical Review 93 (1983): 499—542. 
91 Ned Block, “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”  
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, no. 5 (2007): 481—548. 
92 Ned Block, “Phenomenal and Access Consciousness Ned Block and Cynthia MacDonald: 
Consciousness and Cognitive Access,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (2008): 296. 
93 Ned Block, “Attention and mental paint,” Philosophical Issues 20 (201): 23–63. 
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Sixth Meditation, Descartes writes: 
There is nothing that my own nature teaches me more vividly than that I have a 
body, and that when I feel pain there is something wrong with the body, and that 
when I am hungry or thirsty the body needs food and drink, and so on. So I should 
not doubt that there is some truth in this. Nature also teaches me, by these 
sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my 
body as a sailor is present in a ship…I am very closely joined and, as it were, 
intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.”94 
Notably, Christina does, indeed, experience herself as being present in her 
own body as a sailor is present in a ship.95 She does not remember how to feel 
and has no experience of being intermingled but she instrumentalizes the first-
person pronoun, using the “I” as subject such that her ascription of visual 
experience and self-location are immune to error through misidentification. 
Christina does not experience herself as a physical entity but as a bearer of a 
point of view on her body, able to locate her body in space when the body has 
lost the proprioceptive ability to locate itself. This harmony of performance 
becomes equipollent to “consciousness of oneself as subject,” with Christina’s use 
of “I” transposed in a sensorimotor key, perceptual awareness bolstered by the 
reference rule, with Christina engaged in the metacognitive unity of agency and 
action. 
Kant’s Fourth Paralogism Kant outlines Descartes’ two guiding questions: 
1) The Epistemic Question—are we justified in believing that the existence of 
outer objects is open to doubt while only the existence of inner perceptions is 
absolutely certain?  
2) The Ontological Question—are we are justified in thinking that we could exist 
only as a mind rather than as an entity that is inseparably mind and body?96  
While Descartes answers both questions with an affirmative “yes,” for Kant 
with all possible instances of thinking “I think,” thinking of oneself as such 
requires cognizing under a concept (“I”) that can only be subject, not predicate, in 
the proposition “I think.” Thus, Descartes’ “cogito, existo” argument is indubitably 
 
94 René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. 
John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 67. 
95 Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine, 33. 
96 Kant, CPR, A347/B405 
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“directly downstream” from Kant’s theory of the “I think,” for “I think” is the 
expression of a unity of mental activity that conditions all the particular instances 
of ‘I think p.’97 
  
VI 
As Filipa Foot points out in her discussion of the non-hypothetical instantiation 
of “should,” the normative character of Kant’s moral judgment does not 
guarantee its reason-giving force.98 Namely, this is meant to show that Kant is 
mistaken in asserting a radical divide between hypothetical imperatives and 
categorical imperatives with respect to morality. Foot grants that some 
imperatives are hypothetical (“if I want to get to train on time, then I should X”) 
and some seem to be categorical (“you should be charitable”) but that Kant is 
wrong in saying that all moral demands on us must be categorical. Although 
moral judgments are normative, so are judgments of manner/etiquette. 
According to Foot, in every case it is because there is a background of “teaching,” 
or a developmental substratum, that the non-hypothetical “should” can be used. 
Does this mean that we are to say that there is nothing but the relative stringency 
of our moral teaching behind the idea that moral judgments are categorical 
imperatives? Why are some imperatives more forceful than others? For Foot, this 
is tethered to our cultural training—recalling Aristotle’s account of virtues, Foot 
thinks it folly to regard putatively “moral” demands as having some special force 
unique from etiquette. Foot’s conclusion is that “morality is supposed to be 
inescapable in some special way … this may turn out to be merely the reflection 
of the way morality is taught.”99  
Longuenesse’s naturalist solution, recruiting Freud, allots a developmental 
account that grounds psychological compulsion while still engaging with inner 
mental structuration, as per Kant’s initial concern. Moving from theoretical 
cognition to practical cognition, Longuenesse appeals to Freud’s developmental 
account of mental life to examine how our use of “I” in the moral “I ought (to)” 
is premised on a type of self-consciousness that has both an individual and a 
universal aspect—this is not an ontological claim but an epistemological claim. 
 
97 Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine, 82. 
98 Fillipa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Philosophical Review 18, no. 3 
(1972): 305—316. 
99 Ibid., 311. 
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Furthermore, Kant’s view of the structure of our mental life, grounding the use 
of the first-person “I” in “I think’ and in the moral “I ought to,” finds a descendant 
in Freuds ‘ego’ and ‘super-ego.’ Our guiding query concerns the relation between 
the radically individual referent of “I” and the claims to universal validity of those 
first-person moral models exercised in “I (morally) ought to X.”  
Freud’s genealogy of both ego and superego contributes to our understanding 
of the combination of particular and universal claims carried by our use of “I” in 
the moral “I ought to.” For Freud, there is a connection between organizing the 
contents of mental events according to logical rules—organization proper to the 
ego—and the ability to cognize in the first-person. For Freud, the ego’s 
organization (das Ich) is paramount for indexically using the word and concept Ich 
(“I”). This position is strikingly similar to Kant’s, for whom unifying our 
perceptual inputs according to logical rules is a necessary condition for thinking 
in the first-person. Contra prudential and instrumental imperatives, morality, in 
the case of the Categorical Imperative, is universalizable because self-legislation 
has a universal foundation with a standpoint shared by (all) human-beings-cum-
rational-beings. This capability of a universal standpoint in cognition allows us to 
access the particular reasons we may have to act in one way rather than another, 
as well as claiming normative validity in willing. 
Freud explicitly mentions Kant’s Categorical Imperative in two instances, 
remarking that “[a]s the child was once under a compulsion to obey its parents, 
so the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its super-ego” and “Kant’s 
categorical imperative is the direct heir of the Oedipus complex.”100 For Freud, 
the reasoning behind Kant’s categorical imperative being heir to the Oedipus 
complex amounts to saying that its categorical nature has emotional roots and that 
the unconditional demands of morality rest upon emotional life, which also 
sustains the development of the ability to assess, endorse or reject justifications of 
moral commands. According to Freud’s genealogical claim, determinate 
structure is not provided by reason/its universal principle but the structure of 
developmental interdictions and renunciations, which are subsequently 
internalized. Despite this internalization, its original structure, which provides for 
 
100 Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, vol. 19 (London: Hogarth, 1923), 49; “The Economic Problem of Masochism” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth, 1924), 167. 
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the context of what is originally categorical in norms of behavior, remains. 
Acquiring knowledge of facts of the matter about the world (the ego’s “reality 
principle”) counters the repeated “spinning” of fantasies born from earlier, 
uncontrolled traumatic experiences.  
For Freud, the ground level of moral attitude is emotion (stationed in the id 
and its superego) and is a feature of mental life imposed through development 
from childhood through the stages of adulthood. Regardless of if the origin of 
morality is in the id and its outgrowth, the superego, as the “engine” of the id, is 
enrolled in the task of internalizing the features of the ego into the mental life of 
the young child. On Freud’s account, it is the proper work of the ego to transform 
our emotional attitudes—the moral attitude more than any other—into reasoned 
attitudes. Freud naturalizes practical reason with a developmental account of the 
structure of mental life; Freud’s ego provides a developmental story for just the 
unity of apperception grounding the use of “I” in “I think.” Similarly, Freud’s 
metapsychological account of the unconscious component—‘super-ego’—and its 
compulsive power provides a developmental story for the conflicted structure of 
mental life that grounds Kant’s use of “I” in the moral ‘I ought to.’ Thus, 
Longuenesse argues that Freud can naturalize Kant, illuminating the origin of 
the categorical nature of morality as tethered not to reason but emotion.  
Both the Kantian model and Freud’s genealogical model posit overriding 
personal interest in favor of the categorical commands of obligations. For Freud, 
the enlargement of moral concerns runs in parallel with the human infant’s 
development vis-a-vis internalization of norms that trump self-interested rules of 
instrumental agency, resulting in an integration of norms into the rational 
positions concerning the world one inhabits. This depends on three factors: i) 
original internalization of norms; ii) current social context; iii) perceptive 
expansion of our moral compass according to ego’s reality principle. These 
conditions subsume Strawson’s conception of “minimal morality,” Strawson’s 
transcendental condition for the existence of any social organization, which 
moves from the existence of society to the satisfaction of the conditions for it vis-
à-vis the typical observance of a minimal set of rules. Focusing on analytic 
transcendental arguments regarding issues of concept-possession, Strawson’s 
purview focuses almost exclusively upon our concepts and their interrelations—
as Kenneth Westphal remarks, “the strongest conclusion Strawson can justify 
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pertains to how we must ‘conceive’ or ‘think of ’ our experience, how we must 
‘take’ objects to be, or how we must perceive them ‘as’ physical objects and 
events.”101 Unlike Strawson’s interpersonal relating qua minimal expectation, 
however, Freudian self-consciousness is not directed at ourselves/self-perception 
but at ourselves in the world. Thus, we argue, the moral “I ought” illuminates a 
combination of the particular standpoint premised on individual emotional 
biography (Freud) and rationally endorsed binding (Strawson). Freud, reminding 
us of the archaic roots of morality in human psychology, voices agreement with 
Kant’s position that the moral attitude is made necessary by the fact that conflicts 
between egoistic interest and categorical moral commands arise necessarily, and 
Strawson’s espousing revision through restless groping, the moral ‘I ought’ 




Strawson correlates the diachronicity of the scientific picture to tractable moral 
concepts via the objective and reactive attitude. Disambiguating reference-
dependence, Sellars’ work on the metaphysics of mind evinces that, even if our 
observation reports about the world are typically caused by sensory impressions, 
the empirical concepts and judgments made on their basis are not by default 
about sensations. The Strawsonian-Sellarsian lesson, despite both philosophers’ 
shortcomings, proffers characterizing conceptual behavior in terms of socially 
instituted attitudes and generating a dialogic and social space of interactions 
between multiple agents who, themselves, are developmentally situated.  
As Freud relates to Kant, Longuenesse draws out the imagination’s role in 
producing and binding images in what Freud calls the “pre-conscious” and thus 
the “ego,” where images and their associations are tethered with words and thus 
available for judgment. Most critically, the Freudian subject can come to know—
noninferentially and nonobservationally—the repressed content of its 
unconscious even though the thought is not phenomenally conscious. Just as Freudian 
presentiments and repressed memories can be unconscious, facing 
 
101 Kenneth Westphal, Kant’s Critical Epistemology, 67. 
102 Longuenesse, First Person in Cognition, 64. 
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phenomenological blockage, so is A-consciousness. Freudian unconsciousness 
does not require P-unconsciousness, but it does require A-unconsciousness, as A-
consciousness indicates the cavernous substratum of where traumatically-licensed 
phenomena (e.g., repressed mental images) are suspended until they are culled 
by, say, psychoanalytic therapy.  
The super-ego, the repository of an individual’s moral standards, is, for Freud, 
incredibly plastic during childhood-to-adolescent development, internalizing 
external demands. The ego is the part of the psyche in which mental processes 
are organized in such a way that “what the world is like” finds representation in 
the mind and is projected through the perceptual-consciousness system; the 
super-ego (or the “ego-ideal”) is the unconscious aspect of the ego that sources 
much of our social adaptation and, therefore, is the source of moral imperatives. 
The unconditional character of morality is, for Kant, originally grounded in pure 
reason affecting the faculty of desire; for Freud, it is originally grounded in the 
raw emotion that binds us to the (authority-)figure from whom we have learned 
the rules of our socialization. In its metaphysical probing, Longuenesse’s 
naturalized Kantianism offers the intimate connection, and distinction, between 
consciousness of  oneself  in thinking and consciousness of  one’s own embodied existence 
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